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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, after reviewing the main points of image 
encryption and threshold function, we introduce the 
methods of chaotic image encryption based on 
pseudorandom bit padding that the bits be generated by the 
novel generalized threshold function (segmentation and self-
similarity) methods. These methods decrease periodic effect 
of the ergodic dynamical systems in randomness of the 
chaotic image encryption. The essential idea of this paper is 
that given threshold functions of the ergodic dynamical 
systems. To evaluate the security of the cipher image of this 
scheme, the key space analysis, the correlation of two 
adjacent pixels and differential attack were performed. This 
scheme tries to improve the problem of failure of encryption 
such as small key space and level of security. 
General Terms 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the cryptographic schemes schemes have 
suggested some new and efficient ways to develop secure 
image encryption [4]. These schemes have typical structure 
which performed the permutation and the diffusion stages, 
alternatively. However, most of algorithms be faced with 
some problems such as the lack of robustness and security. 
The random number generators are intransitive in 
cryptography for generation of cryptographic keys, 
allegorically, secret keys utilized in symmetric cryptosystems 
[1,2] and large numbers is intransitive in asymmetric 
cryptosystems [3,5], because of unpredictable, should better 
be generated randomly. In addition, random number 
generators in many cryptographic protocols, such as to 
create challenges, blinding values, Monte Carlo methods are 
used [6,7,8]. Also, the random number generators are used 
more in the diffusion functions of the image encryption for 
diffused pixels of plain image.  
Random number generators can be classified into three 
classes which are pseudorandom number generators 
(PRNGs), true random number generators (TRNGs) and 
hybrid random number generators (HRNGs). PRNGs use 
deterministic processes to generate a series of outputs from 
an initial seed state [9,10,11]. TRNGs use of non-
deterministic source (i.e., the entropy source), along with 
some processing function (i.e., the entropy distillation 
process) to generate the random bit sequence [1]. These 
sources consist of physical phenomena such as atmospheric 
noise, thermal noise, radioactive decay and even coin-
tossing [12]. Many PRNGs using chaotic maps have been 
established. Most of them have very complex structures. In 
this paper, we propose a chaotic image encryption based on 
pseudorandom bit padding that the bits be generated by the 
novel generalized threshold function (segmentation and self-
similarity) methods. The random bit sequences produced by 
this generator are evaluated using the 15 statistical tests 
recommended by U.S. NIST [1]. Experimental results show 
that this PRNG possess good uniformity and randomness 
properties. 
This paper is arranged as follows. In section 2, the 
properties of the threshold functions of ergodic dynamical 
systems are discussed. In section 3, we introduce the 
proposed random number generators and then discuss the 
uniformity and randomness of the bit sequences generated 
by the Proposed PRNG. In section 4, we propose chaotic 
encryption scheme based on pseudorandom bit padding and 
finally, in Section 5, we conclude the paper. 
2. THRESHOLD FUNCTIONS OF 
ERGODIC DYNAMICAL SYSTEMS 
One of the easiest and most widely algorithms for generating 
chaotic encryption scheme, used of the threshold function 
[13,14]. Threshold function is a function that takes the value 
0 if a specified function of the arguments exceeds a given 
threshold and 1 otherwise. To consider a one-dimensional 
chaotic system which is defined as follows: 
,...2,1,0n)x(fx 1nn == −  
that ])1,0[I(II:f =→  is a nonlinear map. 
Threshold function of ergodic dynamical system is 
approximately the middle of the minimum and maximum of 
the ∞
=0nn }x{   values. In the other hand, threshold function 
of ergodic dynamical system can be defined as follows: 
)1(dx)x(f)x(fc 1
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∗
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where the ∗f   is density function of the  nonlinear map 
f [15] .  One of the methods of generating is as follows, to 
consider above one-dimensional chaotic system, the 
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pseudorandom bit sequence ∞
=0nn }z{   can be defined as 
follows (see Fig.1(a)): 
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that c is threshold function of the ∞
=0nn }x{  values.  In 
other words, threshold function divides the interval of 
I=[0,1] into 2 boxes. Widths of boxes are (c) and (1-c), 
respectively. 
3. THE PROPOSED PRNG AND 
RANDOMNESS ANALYSIS 
In this section, we introduce two proposed pseudorandom 
number generators based on the generalized threshold 
function and then their randomness is discussed. 
3.1 The proposed PRNG based on 
segmentation method 
To consider a one-dimensional chaotic system which is 
defined as follows: 
,...2,1,0n)x(fx 1nn == −  
that ])1,0[I(II:f =→  is a nonlinear map. In this 
method, we divided the interval of I=[0,1] into 1k2 −  blocks 
and then divided each block into 2 boxes by threshold 
function (i.e., c). Consequently, we have k2  boxes in the 
interval of I=[0,1]. Width of boxes are )
2
1
c( 1k −×  and 
)
2
1)c1(( 1k −×− , respectively. In this case, the 
pseudorandom bit sequence ∞
=0nn }z{  is defined as follows 
(see Fig.1(b)): 
)3(
wiseother1
c]2x[0
z
1k
n
n



 ≤×
=
−
 
where symbol of [] is the fractional part. With this way, 
randomness of the PRNG is increased, because, this method 
decreased periodic effect of the chaotic maps in randomness 
of the PRNG. With regard to the above contents, we can be 
redefined this method in two-dimension. For this purpose, to 
consider a two-dimensional chaotic system which is defined 
as follows: 
,...2,1,0n)x(fx 1nn == −  
,...2,1,0n)y(gy 1nn == −  
that f and ])1,0[I(II:g =→  are nonlinear maps. 
Threshold functions of the ∞
=0nn }x{  values and the 
∞
=0nn }y{  values are c and c ′ , respectively. Therefore, the 
pseudorandom bit sequence ∞
=0nn }z{  is defined as follows 
(see Fig.1(c)): 
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and symbol of [] is the fractional part.  As an example, we 
consider the chaotic logistic map 
)x1(xrx 1n1nxn −− −=  
 for the functions of  f  and g 
])4,99996.3(r,rand)1,0(y,x( yxnn ∈∈  [16].  In 
this case, threshold functions are 21  (i.e. 21cc =′= ) [17]. 
Thus, pseudorandom bit sequence ∞
=0nn }z{  can be defined 
as follows Eq. 4, Where, 
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and symbol of []  is  the fractional part. 
 
 
Fig 1: a) threshold function of a block, (b) the generalized 
threshold function of 22 ,(k=3) blocks in one-dimension, (c) 
the generalized threshold function of 22 ,(k=3) blocks in 
two-dimension, (d) the generalized threshold function of 
22 ,(k=3) blocks in two-dimension for logistic map (1), the 
boxes of 0  and 1 be showed black and white colors, 
respectively. 
 
3.2 The proposed PRNG based on self-
similarity method 
Self-similarity is the property that a substructure to be 
analogous or identical with an overall structure [18]. In the 
other words, a self-similar object behaves the same when 
viewed at different degrees of magnification, or different 
scales on a dimension (space or time) [18]. As we have 
mentioned, threshold function is a function that takes the 
value 0 if a specified function of the arguments exceeds a 
given threshold and 1 otherwise. In this method, first, to 
consider a one-dimensional chaotic system which is defined 
as follows:  
,...2,1,0n)x(fx 1nn == −  
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that ])1,0[I(II:f =→  is a nonlinear map. Next, we 
consider this interval as a block and divide this block into 2 
boxes by threshold function (i.e. ]1,c(],c,0[ 11 ) (see Fig. 
2(a)). Then, we consider again each of the boxes as a block 
and divide each of these blocks into 2 boxes by threshold 
function (i.e. 
]1,cc(],cc,c(],c,c(],c,0[ 221221112121 ++ ) (see 
Fig. 2(b)). We iterate this divisions k times. In each iteration, 
threshold function showed with ijc  that index of i  indicant 
i th iteration and index of j  indicant j th block. 
Consequently, the interval of I=[0,1] divided into k2  boxes 
by k times iteration of threshold function and the interval of 
I=[0,1]  converts as follows: 
.]1,c...c(...
]cc,c(]c,c(]c,0[I
1k2k1
2k1)1k(1)1k(1)1k(1k1k
−
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In the other hand, this interval using threshold function has 
property of self-similarity. Self-similarity in an interval is the 
property that a subinterval to be analogous or identical with 
an overall interval (see Fig. 2(b)). In here, degree of Self-
similarity is dependent to the number of above iterations, i.e. 
if the interval divided into k2  boxes, degree of Self-
similarity is k. In this case, the pseudorandom bit sequence 
∞
=0nn }z{  is defined as follows (see Fig.2(b)): 
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With this method, randomness of this PRNG is higher than 
the previous PRNG, because, higher than the previous 
method, this method decreased periodic effect of the chaotic 
maps in randomness of the PRNG. With regard to the above 
contents, we can be redefined this method in two-dimension. 
For this purpose, to consider a two-dimensional chaotic 
system which is defined as follows: 
,...2,1,0n)x(fx 1nn == −  
,...2,1,0n)y(gy 1nn == −  
that f and ])1,0[I(II:g =→  are nonlinear maps. 
Threshold functions of  the ∞
=0nn }x{ values and the 
∞
=0nn }y{  values are c and c′ , respectively. Therefore, the 
pseudorandom bit sequence ∞
=0nn }z{  is defined as follows 
(see Fig.2(c)): 
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As an example, we consider one of the one-parameter 
families of chaotic maps  [19] 
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for the functions of  )75.0and)1,0(x(f n =α∈  and 
)5.1and)1,0(y(g n =α∈  [19].  In this case, according 
to the Eq. 1, threshold functions are c=0.436 for ∞
=0nn }x{  
and 634.0c =′  for ∞
=0nn }y{  [19]. Thus, pseudorandom 
bit sequence ∞
=0nn }z{  can be defined as Eq. 6, that  c and 
c′  are 0.436 and 0.634, respectively. 
 
 
Fig 2: (a) threshold function of a block (k=1), (b) the 
generalized threshold function of 12 ,(k=2) blocks in one-
dimension, (c) the generalized threshold function of 
22 ,(k=3) blocks in two-dimension, the boxes of 0  and 1 be 
showed black and white colors, respectively. 
 
3.3 Analysis of randomness of number 
sequences  
We have survey the randomness and uniformity of the 
several bit sequences of large size, generated by the proposed 
PRNGs for different sets of control parameter and initial 
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conditions of the chaotic maps. Here, we show the results for 
202  sized bit sequences corresponding to the following 
parameter values of the four sets: 
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that A and B are related control parameter values of the 
PRNG based on  segmentation  and C and D are related 
control parameter values of the PRNG based on self-
similarity. We have used MATLAB 7.10.0 (R2010a) running 
program in a personal computer with a Core i3 3.1GHz 
intel, 4GB memory and 500GB hard-disk capacity. The 
average time used for generating random bit sequences with 
size of 202  bits is shorter than 0.3 s. 
We discuss in the following paragraph of this Section the 
result and conclusions of our study of the different statistical 
tests to observe the randomness and uniformity of the bit 
sequences generated by the proposed PRNG. The US NIST 
statistical test suite provides 15 statistical tests to detect 
deviations of a bit sequence from randomness. A statistical 
test is formulated to test a null hypothesis which states that 
the sequence being tested is random. There is also an 
alternative hypothesis which states that the sequence is not 
random. For each test, there is an associated reference 
distribution (typically normal distribution or 2χ   
distribution), based on which a P-value  is computed from 
the bit sequence. If the P-value is greater than a predefined 
threshold α  which is also called significance level, then the 
sequence would be considered to be random with a 
confidence of α−1 , and the sequence passes the test 
successfully. Otherwise, the sequence fails this test. A P-
value of zero indicates that the sequence appears to be 
completely non-random, and the larger the P-value is, the 
closer a sequence to a perfect random sequence. In our 
experiment, we set α  to its default value 0.01, which means 
a sequence passed the test is considered as random with  
99% confidence. Before presenting the test results of our 
proposed three approaches, we would first introduce all 15 
statistical tests briefly as follows. A more detailed description 
for those tests could be found in [2]. 
The frequency test (FT), the runs test (RT) and the 
cumulative sum test (CST) are recommended that each 
sequence to be tested consist of a minimum of 210  bits 
(i.e., 210n ≥ ). The frequency Test within a Block (FTB) is 
recommended that each sequence to be tested consist of a 
minimum of NM ×  bits (i.e., MNn ≥ ). The block size M  
should be selected such that 20M ≥ and 210N < . The 
discrete fourier transform test (DFTT) is recommended that 
each sequence to be tested consist of a minimum of 310 bits 
(i.e., 310n ≥ ). The approximate entropy test (AET) is 
recommended that each sequence to be tested consist of  a 
minimum of 122  bits (i.e., 122n ≥ ). The test for the 
longest run of ones in a block (LROBT) is recommended 
that each sequence to be tested consist of a minimum of 
6272 bits for M=128. The binary matrix rank test (BMRT) is 
recommended that each sequence to be tested consist of a 
minimum of 510  bits (i.e., 510n ≥ ). The non-overlapping 
template matching test (NTMT), the overlapping template 
matching test (OTMT), the maurer’s universal statistical test 
(MUST), the linear complexity test (LCT), the serial test 
(ST), the random excursions test (RET) and the random 
excursions variant test (REVT) are recommended that each 
sequence to be tested consist of a minimum of 202  bits (i.e.,  
202n ≥ ).  
The NIST suite tests were performed on four bit sequences, 
each containing 202  bits. The P-value as well as final 
results obtained from the NIST suite for four different sets 
are given in Table 1. The proposed PRNGs successfully pass 
all randomness tests of NIST suite. According to [1], we can 
conclude that the data generated by these PRNGs are 
random. 
Table 1. Shows the P-values obtained from NIST suite 
for fifteen different tests. The P-values are obtained for four 
different sets of parameters for each test. 
NIST Tests                   A                B          C D 
FT 0.10128 0.95950 0.87737 0.50042 
FBT 0.84189 0.64194 0.38602 0.92200 
RT 0.97716 0.96884 0.85741 0.13400 
LROBT 0.80721 0.03414 0.74711 0.48042 
RBMRT 0.56967 0.77062 0.54269 0.52658 
DFTT 0.07511 0.44408 0.78391 0.05936 
ATMT PASS PASS PASS PASS 
PTMT 0.21344 0.78374 0.94976 0.68709 
MUST 0.13269 0.21346 0.40399 0.17531 
LCT 0.29186 0.69918 0.83787 0.93722 
ST      
(P1) 
(P2) 
 
0.07947 
0.48049 
 
0.41921 
0.44903 
 
0.17617 
0.40804 
 
0.05515 
0.01233 
AET 0.19412 0.33766 0.70768 0.58916 
CST   
(FORWARD) 
(REVERSE) 
 
0.19653 
0.06508 
 
0.79288 
0.83809 
 
0.97455 
0.88538 
 
0.68534 
0.57830 
RET PASS PASS PASS PASS 
REVT PASS PASS PASS PASS 
 
4. THE PROPOSED ENCRYPTION 
SCHEME AND SECURITY ANALYSIS 
In this section, we introduce the encryption scheme based on 
the proposed PRNGs and then their security is discussed. 
4.1 Encryption scheme based on 
pseudorandom bit padding 
In the proposed scheme, we create a method to encrypt the 
image using bits padding. To consider a gray scale image 
with the size of NM × . The steps of the encryption are 
shown below: 
• Step 1:  Generate NM8 ××   pseudo-random number 
sequence using one of the proposed PRNGs. 
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• Step 2:  Transform the image into NM8 ××  bit 
sequence (image sequence).  
• Step 3: Perform the XOR operation between the image 
sequence and the pseudo-random bit sequence to form 
the cipher sequence.  
• Step 4:  Transform the cipher sequence into image 
matrix  I (ciphered image).  
• Step 5: Divide the matrix  I into four parts, uniformly. 
Move the odd columns with the even columns between 
the two parts in the main diagonal and between the 
other two parts, respectively. 
• Step 6: Divide the matrix  I into four parts, uniformly. 
Move the odd rows with the even rows  between the two 
parts in the main diagonal and between the other two 
parts, respectively.  
 
An indexed image of an 'Albert Einstein' sized 256256 ×  
(see Fig. 3(a)) is used as a plain image and the encrypted 
images are shown in Figs. 3. The grey scale histograms are 
given in Figs. 4. The Figs. 4(b), 4(c), 4(d) and 4(e) show 
uniformity in distribution of grey scale of the encrypted 
images. In addition, the average pixel intensity for plain 
image is 98.92, and for encrypted images are 127.60, 127.69, 
127.32, 127.55, respectively. 
 
Fig 3: Images of test results. 
 
Fig 4: Histograms of images. 
 
4.2 Analysis of security of the proposed 
encryption scheme  
Security is a major intransitive of a cryptosystem. Here, a 
complete analysis is made on the security of the 
cryptosystem. We have tried to explain that this cipher image 
is sufficiently secure against various cryptographical 
attacks, as shown below: 
4.2.1 Key space analysis 
The Key space size is the total number of different keys that 
can be used in the encryption [21]. Security issue is the size 
of the key space. If it is not large enough, the attackers may 
guess the image with brute-force attack. If the precision is 
1410 − , the size of key spaces for initial conditions and 
control parameters of the self-similarity method and 
segmentation method are 1862  and 2062 , respectively. 
These sizes are large enough to defeat brute-force by any 
super computer today. 
4.2.2 Correlation Coefficient analysis 
The statistical analysis has been performed on the encrypted 
images from examples of A, B, C, D. This is shown by a test 
of the correlation between two adjacent pixels in plain image 
and encrypted image. We randomly select 2000 pairs of two-
adjacent pixels (in vertical, horizontal, and diagonal 
direction) from plain images and ciphered images, and 
calculate the correlation coefficients, respectively by using 
the following two equations (see Table 2 and Fig. 5) [20,21]: 
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Where, E(x) is the estimation of mathematical expectations 
of   x,  D(x) is the estimation of variance of   x, and Cov(x,y) 
is the estimation of covariance between x and y, where x and 
y are grey scale values of two adjacent pixels in the image. 
Table 2: Correlation coefficients of two adjacent pixels 
in the plain image and the ciphered images of examples of 
A, B, C, D 
Direction Plain Image Ciphered Image 
 A B C D 
Horizontal 0.9341 0.0026 0.0019 0.0015 0.0004 
Vertical 0.9634 0.0087 0.0095 0.0021 0.0046 
Diagonal 0.9402 0.0036 0.0038 0.0029 0.0024 
 
 
Fig 5: Correlation distributions of two horizontally 
adjacent pixels in the plain image and the ciphered images. 
 
4.2.3 Differential attack 
Attackers try to find out a relationship between the plain 
image and the cipher image, by studying how differences in 
an input can affect the resultant difference at the output in 
an attempt to derive the key [22]. Trying to make a slight 
change such as modifying one pixel of the plain image, 
attacker observes the change of the cipher image [22]. To 
test the influence of one pixel change on the whole 
encrypted image by the proposed scheme, two common 
measures are used: 
 Number of Pixels Change Rate (NPCR) stands for the 
number of pixels change rate while, one pixel of plain image 
is changed. Unified Average Changing Intensity (UACI) 
measures the average intensity of differences between the 
plain image and ciphered image. The NPCR and The UACI, 
are used to test the influence of one pixel change on the 
whole image encrypted by the proposed scheme and can be 
defined as following: 
%100
255
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where W  and H  are the width and height of 1C  or 
2C . 1C  and 2C  are two ciphered images, whose 
corresponding original images have only one pixel 
difference and also have the same size. The )j,i(C1 and 
)j,i(C2 are grey-scale values of the pixels at grid (i,j). The 
D(i,j)  determined by )j,i(C1  and )j,i(C2 . If  
)j,i(C)j,i(C 21 = , then, D(i, j) = 1; otherwise, D(i, j) = 
0. We have done some tests on the proposed scheme (256 
grey scale image of size 256256 × ) to  find out the extent 
of change produced by one pixel change in the plain image 
(see Table 3). The results demonstrate that the proposed 
scheme can survive differential attack. 
Table 3: Results of the differential attack in the ciphered 
images of examples of A, B, C, D. 
 A B C D 
NPCR 42% 48% 45% 38% 
UACI 38% 33% 31% 39% 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
We have proposed a chaotic encryption scheme based on 
pseudorandom bit padding that the bits be generated by the 
novel generalized threshold function (segmentation and self-
similarity) methods. The security of the cipher images of this 
scheme is evaluated by the key space analysis, the 
correlation of two adjacent pixels and differential attack. 
The distributions of the ciphered images are very close to the 
uniform distribution, which can well protect the information 
of the image to withstand the statistical attack. We suggest 
the use of these methods to design other secure 
cryptosystems.         
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